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NOTES
as much protection today as creditors."' Until present economic, social,
and political sentiments so change as to cause a general shift in the
legislative policy governing the regulation of corporations, it seems that
"quasi" or "accounting" reorganization must be preserved unregulated
except for the deterrent liability on directors and stockholders when a
distribution of reduction surplus violates applicable statutory restrictions.

LOCAL-STATE RELATIONS IN INDIANA: PROPOSED CHARTER
MAKING POWERS FOR MUNICIPALITIES
The extent to which cities and towns' in Indiana should be permitted to govern themselves has been a subject of constant controversy.2
To the many individuals who inhabit these political subdivisions' the
question of home rule is more than academic. The manner of government under which they live affects materially the amount of taxes they
115. See Dodd, Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886-5936,
50 HARV. L. REv. 27, 58 (1936).
1. Indiana cities are divided into five population groupings by statute. IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 48-1201, 48-1202 (Bums 1950). Towns are incorporated places of 1500 persons
or less. However, some of those having more than 1500 population are still classified as
towns since they have not held the necessary elections to become cities.
2. For a while the Indiana Supreme Court followed the inherent right doctrine
enunciated by Judge Cooley in Michigan. People ex rel." Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich.
44, 9 Am. Rep. 103 (1871). The gist of the doctrine is that, in the absence of any express provision in state constitutions, cities and towns have certain inherent rights of
self-government which cannot be interfered with by the legislature. Evansville v. State,
ex rel. Blend, 118 Ind. 426 (1889) ; State ex rel. Holt v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449 (1889) ;
State ex rel. Geake v. Fox, 158 Ind. 126, 63 N.E. 19 (1902). The Indiana cases have
never been expressly overruled but have since been interpreted as holding that the inherent powers are identical with those commonly designated as implied or incidental
powers essential to enable municipal corporations to accomplish the purposes for which
they are created. Logansport v. Public Service Commission, 202 Ind. 523, 529, 177 N.E.
249, 251 (1931). The inherent right doctrine has also been regarded as an exception to
the general rule that the legislative power of the state is limited only by the express
provisions in the constitution. State ex rel. Schroeder v. Morris, 199 Ind. 78, 88, 155
N.E. 198, 202 (1927).
For a detailed critical analysis of the inherent right doctrine see McBain, The Doctrite of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COL. L. REv. 190-216, 299-322
(1916).
3. According to the 1950 United States Census, 2,217,468 persons, or nearly sixty
percent of the total population of Indiana, reside in cities and towns. INDIANA STATE
CHAMBER OF COMMuRCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF INDIANA COUNTIES 7 (1954).
4. The term "home rule" has several connotations. In the sense that cities and
towns may choose their own officers to administer local government they have always
had home rule. However, as referred to here, it involves not only the right of cities
and towns to choose their own officers but also the authority to determine for themselves their form of government and to make policy decisions in municipal matters without first securing the assent of the legislature. MoTT, HOME RULE FOR AmERICA'S CITIEs
6 (1949) .
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pay and the quantity and quality of the services provided them to facilitate
the functioning of their daily life.5
The Optional Charter amendment' recently before the Indiana
General Assembly is another in a series of attempts by this state to adjust
the extent of the central government's control over its cities and towns.7
Like a constitutional grant of home rule, it involves a redistribution of
the legislative power of the state.8 While there are variations in the
application of the theory of home rule from state to state insofar as the
degree of powers granted are concerned,9 the concept of home rule im5. The role of government is especially significant in an urbanized society. The
diversity of social and economic interests, the complexity of its network of social relations, the characteristics of its population-all determine and condition the functions of
municipal government. The policies to be adopted and the choice of methods of administration bear more directly on the people than at any other level of government.
SCHULZ, AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT 20 (1949).
6. Acts 1953, c. 289. [Senate Joint Res. No. 2].
7. In 1921, the General Assembly enacted a law to provide for alternative forms of
government for cities. Acts 1921, c. 218. Michigan City and Evansville adopted charters
for the council-manager form of government. In the case of Sarlls v. State ex rel.
Trimble, 201 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270 (1929), the act was challenged as unconstitutional,
but the Indiana Supreme Court upheld it in every particular. But when Indianapolis
attempted to adopt a charter under the act it was declared unconstitutional by the same
court at the following term. Keane v. Remy, 201 Ind. 286, 168 N.E. 10 (1929). Section
3 of the act imposing a duty on the city clerk to certify that signatures on a petition were
those of qualified voters created, according to the court, a non-delegable judicial duty. As
it would be impossible for the clerk to personally certify the signatures within the time
allowed the act was unworkable as to Indianapolis. If it was inapplicable to one city,
the court reasoned it was not a general law. Therefore, it violated section 23, article 4
of the Indiana Constitution.
An attempted amendatory act extending the time for certifying the signatures, Acts
1929, c. 60, was invalidated by the court as an attempt to amend an unconstitutional
statute. In view of the fact that the court's only objection to the act was that not enough
time was allowed the clerk to check the signatures, presumably, if the legislature had
reenacted the statute extending the time, the entire act would have been valid. It is
also open to question whether the duty imposed on the clerk was a non-delegable judicial
function. The court merely assumed this point. The fact that so short a period was
allowed would seem to indicate that the legislature did not intend the clerk personally to
check all the signatures. It would indicate rather that the legislative intent was to
confer upon him only ministerial duties.
In 1939, the General Assembly authorized the appointment of a City-Manager Study
Commission to study, draft, and submit to the General Assembly such legislation as
would be necessary to provide the authority for the adoption of the manager plan of
government in cities throughout the state. Acts 1939, c. 176 [House Concurrent Res.
No. 2]. This commission submitted a report which proposed the adoption of a con-

stitutional amendment providing for home rule.

REPORT OF THE INDIANA CITY MANAGER

(1940). A revised version of the commission's proposal passed the 1941
session. Acts 1941, c. 243. [House Joint Res. No. 5]. It failed of passage in 1943. The
original proposal of the 1939 commission was introduced in 1949 but did not reach the
floor of the Assembly.
8. Withnell v. Ruecking Construction Co., 249 U.S. 63, 68 (1919).
9. In Colorado, for example, after an enumeration of eight specific powers that
home rule cities may exercise, it is stipulated: "It is the intention of this article to grant
and confirm to the people of all municipalities coming within its provisions the full right
of self-government in both local and municipal matters and the enumeration herein of
STUDY COMM'N

NOTES
plies the existence of substantive powers which a municipality may exercise and which cannot be invaded by the legislature." Since an amendment of the type proposed in Indiana grants only charter-making or procedural powers 1 it cannot be properly classified as a constitutional home
rule grant."2 Because of this it has been urged that the amendment be
rejected. 3 Nearly eighty years of experience' with the application of the
home rule theory indicates that home rule is not the solution to the comThis amendment, however,
plex problems of state-local relations."
certain powers shall not be construed to deny such cities and towns, and to the people
thereof, any right or power essential or proper to the full exercise of such right."
COLO. CONST. Art. XX, § 6.
The Minnesota home rule provision, on the other hand, grants no substantive powers
which are beyond the control of the state legislature. MINN. CONST. Art. IV, § 36. See
McBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HoIME RULE 118 (1916).
10. The availability of substantive powers under the classic theory of home rule
depends upon the exercise by the city or town of the charter-making power. McBAIN,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 112.
11. The 1939 City Manager Study Commission whose recommendations were almost
completely embodied in the current amendment stated in its report: "Unlike so-called
home rule amendments in a number of states the proposed amendment does not permit
a city or town to determine what functions of local self-government it cares to exercise.
The determination of functions of local government remains with the General Assembly."
REPORT OF THE INDIANA CITY MANAGER STUDY COM1,'N 8 (1940).
12. The plenary power of the General Assembly over the functions and duties of
municipalities and their officers would be altered by the amendment only to the extent
that it could not prescribe the form of charter for city and town governments or their
internal structure.
Section 3(1) recognizes that the General Assembly would be able to place duties and
responsibilities on charter cities and their officers. All powers of local civil government not mentioned in section 3 would remain subject to general laws of the state by the
terms of section 4 of the amendment. Because the General Assembly would retain
control and would continue to deal with local problems the charter cities and towns would
not have home rule in the technical sense of the term. See Mor, op. cit. supra note 4, at
8-9.
13. Only recently has the Indiana Municipal League voiced its opposition to the
proposed amendment. Indianapolis Star, Nov. 14, 1954, p. 1, col. 4.
14. Missouri in 1875 became the first state to provide for municipal home rule by
constitutional amendment. Since that time 20 states have adopted constitutional provisions for home rule: ARiz. CONST. Art. XIII, §§ 2, 3; CALIF.-.CONST. Art. XI, § 6 et
seq.; COLO. CONST. Art. XX, §§ 1-6; LA. CONST. Art. XIV, § 40; MD. CONST. Art. XIV
§ 1 et seq.; MICH. CONST. Art. VIII, §§ 20 et seq.; MINN. CONST. Art. IV, § 36; Mo.
CONST. Art VI, §§ 19, 20; NEB. CONST. Art. XI, § 2-5; NEv. CONST. Art. VIII,
§ 8; N.Y. CONST. Art. IX, §§ 9, 11-12; OHIO CONST. Art. XVIII, §§ 2, 3; OKLA. CONST.
Art. XVIII, §§ 2-5; ORE. CONST. Art. XI, §§ 2, 2a; PA. CONST. Art. XV, § 1; R.I. CONST.
AMiEND. XXVIII; TEX. CONST. Art. XI, § 5; UTAH CONST. Art. XI, § 5; WASH. CONST.
Art. XI, §§ 10, 11; W. VA. CONST. Art. VI, § 39a; Wis. CONST. Art. XI, § 3.
15. The decided tendency of courts to construe strictly constitutional grants of
home rule powers, the frequent failure of legislatures to clearly define the scope of local
autonomy in home rule grants and the imposition of limitations on the exercise of
granted powers are the principal defects in the application of the home rule theory. For
analysis of these points see: Brachtenbach, Home Ride in Washington--At the Whim
of the Legislature, 29 WASH. L. R v. 295 (1954) ; Greenwood, Powers of Municipal Corporations-ItchtdingHoine Ride, 22 TENN. L. REv. 480 (1952) ; Richland, Constitutional
City Home Ride in New York, 54 COL. L. REv. 311 (1954) ; Schmandt,.Municipal Home
Rule in Missouri, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 385; White, Constitutional Changes in Matters
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limited as it is to a grant of procedural powers should be adopted for it
embodies a fresh attack upon the at once difficult and fundamental problems of the overall state-local governmental arrangement.
Changes in the socio-economic structure of urban communities"8 have
caused problems to arise that transcend artificial corporate boundaries.
A larger community has developed, the interests of which cannot adequately be protected by the classical "city" or "town" governments." The
manner of law enforcement within an urban community affects materially the rate of crime and law violations throughout the whole metropolitan area."8 Regulations governing fire, safety, and public health as
well as the maintenance of streets and highways to be effective throughout a populated area must be coordinated."9 As the corporate boundaries
of a city define the legal limits of its authority,2" and, since home rule
operates only within such limits, even a grant of broad substantive
powers would not be a satisfactory solution. 2 ' A city remains powerless,
both legally and economically, 22 to tackle the many problems that affect
the interests of the whole socio-economic unit.23 Any policy which seeks
to entrust the responsibility for performing the necessary services to a
unit of government that simply is unable to reach all those affected by
the problems is obviously unsound.
Moreover, the extra-territorial implications of "local" problems and
functions indicate that these problems and functions are no longer "local"
of Home Rule and Municipal Government, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 428 (1952).
16. See ANDERSON AND WEIDNER, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

IN THE UNITED

172-174 (1951).
According to the definition adopted for use in the 1950 census, the urban population
comprises all persons living in (a) places of 2,500 inhabitants or more incorporated as
cities, boroughs and villages, (b) incorporated towns of 2,500 inhabitants or more, (c) the
densely settled urban fringe, including both incorporated and unincorporated areas,
STATES

around cities of 50,000 or more and (d)

unincorporated places of 2,500 inhabitants or

more outside any urban fringe. UNITED STATES CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950 Vol. I,
XV (U.S. Bureau of Census 1952).
17. For a critique of the current trend in urbanization and the concomitant community-wide problems see WOODBURY, THE FUTURE OF CITIES AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 485-507 (1953).
18. ANDERSON AND WEIDNER,

19.

op. cit. supra note 16, at 173.

Ibid.

20. See REP. N. Y. STATE CONST. CONVENTION COMM.,
HOME RULE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 63 (1938).

PROBLEMS RELATING TO

21. See for a discussion of this point GOODNOW AND BATES, MUNICIPAL GOVERN108 (1919).
22. The borrowing power of municipal corporations in Indiana is limited to two
percent of the assessed valuation of property within such municipal corporation. IND.
CONST. Art XIII, § 1. For discussion of municipal taxation and its limitations see note
30 infra.
23. For an elaboration see Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and
Practice, 9 OHIo ST. L.J. 18 (1948).
MENT

NOTES
at all.24 There is a unity of interests between all levels of government in
matters that affect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the
people.25 Attempts to define the extent of autonomy to be accorded cities
and towns in such tenuous terms as "local" or "municipal" affairs26 are
based upon misconceptions of the true nature of government.27
A practical consideration which is often overlooked by home rule
enthusiasts in their demands for exclusive authority over local functions
is the adequacy of the power to finance these functions. Whatever may
be the theoretical authority of governments in cities and towns, it cannot
be exercised without the requisite funds.2" Traditionally, the principal
tax base of Indiana local governments has been real and personal property
taxes.2" In recent years this source has proved to be insufficient to finance the operations of local governments because of its inelasticity 0
and because of the ever increasing exemptions."' In practice the granting
24.

See TooKE

AND McINTIRE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

305 (3d ed., 1942) for a consideration of the increasing impact of local affairs on state
matters.
25. In upholding a statute providing for a metropolitan police force for certain
cities which the appellants contended was an invasion of the cities' right of local selfgovernment the Indiana Supreme Court said: "The maintenance of peace and quiet and
the suppression of crime and immorality are matters of general interest, and to the
attainment of these ends the cities and towns are largely subject to legislative control.
As the commonwealth is a unit in respect to its interests in such matters, the regulation
thereof is a proper subject of legislation. . . ." Arnett v. State ex rel. Donohue, 168 Ind.
180, 182 (1907). The court distinguished a similar statute which had been declared
unconstitutional in Evansville v. State ex rel. Blend, 118 Ind. 426 (1889) on the ground
that that act applied to both municipal fire and police departments. Ibid.
26. I MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 272 (2d ed., Smith, 1940).
27. "The inherent weakness of the home rule charter system lies in the fact that no
clear separation can be made between matters which are of strictly local importance and
those which directly or indirectly affect interests outside the municipality. Governmental
authority is not a thing that can be mapped off in blocks and lots like a tract of land;
it is a field that is always expanding or contracting, besides being constantly changed
in the urgency of its exercise. . . . [T]he line of demarcation between matters of local
and general interest is becoming increasingly difficult to draw." MUNRO, 7 ENcYc. Soc.
Scr. 434, 435 (1932).
28.

See GOODNOW, MUNICIPAL HOIE RULE 49, 50 (1895).

29. IND. CoMM'N ON STATE TAX AND FINANCING POLICY, PRELIMINARY REP. 70
(1954) ; see Fordham and Mallison, Local lIcome Taxation, 11 Orio ST. L.J. 217 (1950).
30. The chief limitation of the property tax is that it is politically impossible to
expand and contract it to keep pace With increased revenue requirements. Economists
believe also that it would be unsound to continually increase the burden of property taxes
for it does not necessarily relate to the ability-to-pay. A further limitation is the fact
that it only applies to property within cities' geographical boundaries while the benefits
it provides are enjoyed by the commuting suburbanite who does not share its burden.
Id. at 71; WOODBURY, op. cit. supra note 17, at 665.
31. The Indiana Commission on State Tax and Financing Policy in its preliminary
report, April, 1954, expressed the opinion that it would be desirable to exempt household
goods from property taxation. It was questionable whether such could be done in view
of Article 10, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. An opinion was requested and received from the Att'y General on this question to the effect that it would not be possible
to exempt household furnishings and equipment from personal property tax rolls spe-
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of home rule taxing powers32 has proved to be far less than a complete
answer to this problem. In Ohio, the pre-emption doctrine has been used
to prevent home rule cities from exploiting other sources of revenue. 3
In Missouri, the power of home rule cities to tax has been construed to
be little more than a matter of legislative grace. 4 In view of the enlarged governmental services and the consequent increase in costs of financing schools,35 streets, public welfare, health and other functions,36
the broadest home rule authority to undertake such projects without the
necessary power to raise sufficient funds is of little value.
For some communities home rule coupled with full responsibility for
the costs of the necessary governmental services would result either in
cifically by statute, without constitutional amendment. IND. COar I'N ON STATE TAX AND
FINANCING POLICY, PRELIMINARY REP. 49 (1954).
See the list of present exemptions in IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-201 (Burns 1951).
32. In some states the constitutional provision for home rule expressly confers taxing powers on municipalities. COLO. CONST. Art. XX, § 6 (g). In others the legislature
is required to grant the power by general law and is thereafter forbidden to impose taxes
upon municipalities or their inhabitants for municipal purposes. See CALIF. CONST. Art.
XI, § 12. In Ohio the power of home rule cities to levy taxes is given in a negative
way. It is provided that the legislature may pass laws to limit the power of municipalities to levy taxes. OHIO CONST. Art. XVIII, § 13.
33. Where the state has imposed a tax upon a particular subject cities and towns are
precluded from imposing a tax on the same subject. The application of the pre-emption
doctrine may be either express or it may be implied from a tax of a character similar to
the one the local body seeks to impose. Haefner v. Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58, 68
N.E.2d 64 (1946); Cincinnati v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 112 Ohio St.
493, 147 N.E. 806 (1925) ; State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. 220, 229, 124 N.E.
134, 136 (1919).
See generally Glander and Dewey, Mtnicipal Taxation: A Study of the Pre-Emption Doctrine, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 72 (1948).

34. The legislature in Missouri is prohibited from imposing taxes on cities for
municipal purposes but may vest in the cities the power to assess and collect taxes for
such purposes. The legislature, however, does possess the power to determine the kind
of taxes the city may impose. Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 337 Mo.
913, 87 S.W.2d 195 (1935).
In answer to a home rule city's contention that the tax the legislature sought to impose upon it was for a purely local purpose and therefore violative of the constitutional
prohibition, the Missouri Court said, "The distinction is not between local and general
concern, but between corporate and governmental functions. The power of taxation is
a governmental function which the constitution authorizes the general assembly to delegate to the city as to municipal taxes, but only in a manner 'consistent with and subject
to the constitution and laws of the state.'" Coleman v. Kansas City, 353 Mo. 150, 161,
182 S.W.2d 74, 77 (1944). The court further said that it was within the power of the
legislature to determine not only the kind of taxes a municipality may impose but also
the manner in which taxes may be levied and collected by the city. Ibid.
35. While all functions of local government reflected a substantial increase in costs,
expenditures for education in local communities represented the major item in dollar
volume of the record-breaking 1949-1950 fiscal year. Expenditures for education in the
1949-1950 fiscal year were 15.5 percent over 1948-1949 and 161.6 percent over the fiscal
year 1940-1941. IND. STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, IND. TAX AND SOCIAL SECURITY
MANUAL § IV,

p.

1 (1951 ed.).

36. See for a description of these functions IND. STATE
HERE IS YOUR INDIANA GOVERNMENT 75-80 (6th ed. 1953).

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,

NOTES
highly inadequate services or a complete lack of them." A primary reason for the Indiana system of tax collection and fiscal administration is
to apply the ability-to-pay theory of taxation to the state as a whole instead of allowing each city or town to support its own activities at whatever level its own economic base will allow. 8 Recently the Indiana Municipal League in objecting to the attitude of the state towards its municipalities in matters of finance emphasized the fact that certain cities receive back in the form of state-aid only a small portion of the taxes collected at the local level.39 While the larger cities and towns are able, with
ample revenues derived from low tax rates levied on high assessed valuations, to furnish the services demanded of them by their citizens, the
smaller communities can only manage to provide a semblance of desirable
or necessary services.4" State assistance4 ' in paying the costs of these
services illustrates the pervading state interest both in seeing that the
services are furnished and that they are maintained at a reasonably high
level throughout the state. It further shows that complete independence
cannot exist when problems are common to all levels of government.42
The major functions of government involve an emphasis on cooperation
not independence.
An amendment granting only procedural powers would tend to
eliminate some of the major problems of achieving a satisfactory relationship between municipalities and the state. It would permit cities and
towns to determine their form of government and organizational structure, to make rules relative to selection, term, compensation, hours of
work and dismissal of personnel, and to provide for recall of elective
37. See WooDBURY, op. cit. supra note 17, at 521.
38. This is evidenced by the disparity in the amount of state-aid given to the various
units of local governments. E.g., in 1950, the percentage of state-aid given civil cities in
Indiana was only 6.7 of their total receipts whereas state-aid represented 12.8 percent
of the total receipts of civil towns. IND. COMM'N ON STATE TAX AND FINANCING POLICY,
PREimrTAiY REP. 64 (1954). "The general over-all premise for a system of state aid
to local units is that it broadens the tax base and thus does not burden unduly the taxpayer
of any particular area." IND. STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, IND. TAX AND SOCIAL SECURITY MANUAL. § V, p. 2 (1951 ed.).
39. It was declared: "The people of New Albany paid to the State in the fiscal
year 1953-1954 approximately $3,490,119. The State returned to the civil City of New
Albany only $159,690.38." Louisville Courier-Journal, Oct. 7, 1954, § 2, p. 1, col. 7.
40. WooDBURy, op. cit. supra note 17, at 521.
41. State-aid shifts the burden of financing local governmental functions from
property to non-property tax sources. In Indiana this shift has been largely to the gross
income tax and taxes on motor vehicles and their use. Since 1933, the state government
has depended primarily on non-property taxes for revenues. In 1950-1951, 69.3 percent of
the state's revenues were from the gross income tax. The percentage rose to 72.31 in the
fiscal period 1952-1953. INn. COT"'N ON STATE TAX AND FINANCING POLICY, PRELImINARY REP.

42.

See

4 (1954).

ANDERSON AND WEIDNER,

op. cit. supra note 16, at 136.
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officials.4" Presently, the General Assembly regulates these functions
through legislation44 which is notable for its overlapping provisions and
general confusion. 5 This is a natural result of the rule that cities and
towns can exercise only such powers as are expressly granted by the legislature or necessarily implied from an express grant.46 Permitting a city
or town to formulate a charter under an amendment of the kind proposed
would relieve the General Assembly of the details of local government"
and avoid uncertain and conflicting legislation."
Further, it would remove from the General Assembly the temptation to interfere with the
internal operation of municipal governments for reasons of partisan
politics. 9
The desirability of permitting cities and towns to choose their own
form of government is not questioned. It cannot be overemphasized,
however, that a mere change in the form of government is not a guarantee
of good government. Civic obligations can be as persistently evaded by
citizens under the commission form as under the mayor-council or councilmanager form of government. The success of any municipal administration depends not upon the form but upon the character and ability of the
personnel who administer it.5" Governmental organization is a factor,
however, that may impede or facilitate successful municipal administration."' In view of this, cities and towns should be allowed to work out
for themselves a system of governmental organization conforming to
their own peculiar needs and desires and should not be compelled to
operate under a system rigidly prescribed for them by the General
Assembly.5"
43. The proposed amendment is explicit as to these points. Acts 1953, c. 289.
[Senate Joint Res. No. 2].
44. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-1202, 48-1806 (Burns 1950).
45. Although Indiana cities are divided into five general classes with varying organizational structures, there are statutes creating special classes within and among one or
more of the five general classes. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-2501; 48-2513; 48-2531
(Burns 1950).
46. Southern Ry. Co. v. Harpe, 223 Ind. 124, 58 N.E.2d 346 (1944).
47. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-1407 (Burns 1950) where there are listed 51
separate powers that common councils of cities may exercise.
48. See Heyerdahl, Indiana Still Seeks Home Rnle, 43 NATIONAL MU'-ICIPAL REv.

182 (1954).
49.
50.

See KNEIER, CITY GOVERNIMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 63-68 (1947).
A self-evident but often forgotten truism; see 1 MCQUILLIN, THE L.Aw OF Mu-

NICIPAL CORPORATIONS 961 (2d ed., Smith, 1940).
51. See WOODBURY, op. cit. supra note 17, at

524.

52. The House concurrent resolution authorizing the appointment of a commission
to prepare and recommend legislation to enable cities to adopt the city-manager plan of
government recited: "Whereas, In the interest of local self-government and home rule
it should lie within the province of the majority of the citizens of each city of this state
to select for themselves the form of the government of such city; and Whereas, Under
the present law of the state there is now no opportunity for the people residing in mu-

NOTES

It has been contended by those who have opposed the Optional
Charter amendment that, as it is drawn, the proponents of a particular form of city government will have an advantage in any local election for the adoption of a charter.5" The possibility that any type of
government will be foisted upon an unsuspecting populace is more apparent than real. The terms of the proposed amendment are permissive;
no city or town is required to make any change in its organizational
structure of government.5 4 This argument by opponents of the amendment clearly indicates a mistrust in the competency of citizens to exercise
sound judgment at the polls.
Critics further say that the section prescribing the procedure for
charter adoption is made to order for machine politics in that not enough
time is allowed for deliberate consideration of the merits of a proposal. 5
At three stages in the course prescribed for charter making, however, the
electorate may voice their opinion. They must vote on the question of
whether a commission shall be chosen to frame a charter; if a majority
votes affirmatively on this question, the electorate must choose a commission; and the electorate must then decide whether to accept or reject
nicipalities to select the form of government of their choice; and Whereas, There are
many who believe that the Manager Plan of government has proved to be a form of
government making for efficiency and economy. . .

."

Acts 1939, c. 176. [House Con-

current Res. No. 2]. The resolution continued with the proposal of the appointment of
the commission.
While only the manager plan was mentioned, it is evident that the General Assembly
anticipated that other forms of government would be desired by some cities. REPORT OF
THE INDIANA CITY MANAGER STUDY Comm'N

7 (1940).

53. The Indiana Municipal League has objected that the amendment actually seeks
to promote the city manager form of government. The fact that only this form of
government was adopted under the 1921 optional charter statute and the additional fact
that the resolution authorizing the appointment of the 1939 study commission, whose
recommendations are embodied in the present proposal, specifically mentioned only the
manager plan have contributed to this suspicion. However, this objection cannot be
substantiated by the terms of the amendment.
54. The 1939 study commission pointed out in its report that it would be desirable to
allow a wide range of choice among the several forms of city government. Because a
particular form of city government has the organized support of certain civic organizations by no means indicates that the terms of the amendment favor that type. The
League's real objections are to be found outside the terms of the proposal itself. It is
interesting to note that the National Municipal League of which the Indiana organization
is a member has long supported the very type of amendment that is now pending in this
state. Acts 1953, c. 289. [Senate Joint Res. No. 2] see also REPORT OF THE INDIANA
CITY MANAGER STUDY COmm'N 6 (1940).
55. "The time elements in the amendment as it now stands would enable a small,
organized group interested in obtaining a certain form of charter to whisk an election
through so hurriedly that dissenters would not have a chance to raise an articulate voice
or to assemble candidates for the charter commission. The conditions are made to order
for the election of a machine-picked commission which would hustle through a machinedictated job of charter making and schedule an election so swiftly that a citizen away
on an ordinary vacation when the charter was submitted might return to find that it
had already been voted on." Indianapolis Star, Nov. 27, 1954, p. 12, col. 1.
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any proposed charter."
Further, a city or town may alter its form of
government only by resort to the process of charter making as set forth
in the amendment. It would seem, therefore, that the contention that
not enough opportunity is allowed for expression of the popular will is
unwarranted.
The Optional Charter amendment would allow municipalities to coordinate the activities and services performed by special districts within
the framework of municipal government."
The placing of functions in
special districts applies the metropolitan region concept and attacks problems as an integrated whole." The current practice is to create a separate
district for each function thus dispersing the powers to a series of disconnected agencies."5 This tends to contract the power of the central city
government. Section 3 of the Indiana proposal not only would considerably broaden municipal powers by extending them to more areas;
but, by permitting cities and towns to eliminate duplication of efforts and
excessive personnel, the proposal increases the possibilities of reducing
the costs of administration. In this respect the Indiana proposal is most
forward-looking and would contribute greatly to the adjustment of the
complex problems of state-local relations.
While the amendment would promise to alleviate some of the many
56. The procedure for charter adoption is set forth in section 1 of the proposed
amendment. Acts 1953, c. 289. [Senate Joint Res. No. 21.
57. Section 3, Subsection 5 of the amendment provides that any city adopting a
charter under the amendment shall have the authority ". . . To administer any special
district already created or hereafter created if more than half the area of such districts
lie within such city or town, except that this clause shall not apply to districts heretofore
created for the purpose of operating public utilities unless the General Assembly directs
otherwise by law." Ibid.
58. In New York "public authorities," as special districts are called in that state,
which were created by the legislature and vested with powers to affect the "property,
affairs or government" of cities were attacked on the ground that they invaded home
rule powers. Gaynor v. Marohn, 268 N.Y. 417, 198 N.E. 13 (1935) ; Robertson v. Zimmermann, 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935). The court in both cases upheld the constitutionality of the acts creating the public authorities on the ground that the functions
they were to perform were matters of state concern requiring the exercise of the state's
police power.
There are examples in other areas of the wide effect of city functions. The Sanitary
District of Chicago is responsible for sewage disposal over an area of 442 square miles
embracing 61 municipalities within its boundaries. In other metropolitan areas such as
Los Angeles, Boston and Seattle special districts-have been created to maintain parks,
conduct slum clearance and low-cost housing projects and other public works. KNEIER,
CITY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

361, 362 (1947).

In Indiana, the Board of

Sanitary Commissioners in first class cities is given jurisdiction to act outside the cities
corporate boundaries. INn. ANN. STAT. § 48-4203 (Burns 1950).
59. Usually special districts are created to furnish particular municipal services in
order to meet emergencies that may arise. There has been little tendency to give additional functions to such authorities once they have been created. Obviously there is
need for integrating the functions performed by these districts in instances where the
state has extensively made use of this device for alleviating metropolitan problems.

NOTES
problems it would be no panacea. The difficulties involved in determining what functions are appropriate for cities and towns remain. The
General Assembly is compelled to act as a super-city insofar as it determines the duties and functions of cities and towns and their officials." It
'is not the best forum in which to make these decisions."1 Novelty, growth,
and complexity are characteristic of urban life. This creates continuing
problems which take varying forms in different areas of the state. The
governmental body charged with responsibility for dealing with them
must be able to act with dispatch. Flexibility of control is essential.
Efforts to achieve flexibility of legislative control have taken several
forms, the most notable being special legislation 2 and classification.6 3
None has proved to be entirely satisfactory. A review of the events prior
to and after the adoption of constitutional restraints on special legislation
well illustrates the difficulties encountered in legislative control of municipalities." Whether or not a city or town is granted the power to
perform a given function should depend not upon the whims of factions
in the law making body but upon a thorough investigation of the necessity
and propriety of the power.
A method of control of the functions of city government that is
gaining more and more acceptance is that of administrative regulation."
In the field of taxation and finance Indiana has adopted one of the most
advanced plans of administrative control in the United States. 6 Recent
years have been marked by a growing appreciation of the advantages of
60. See Heyerdahl, op. cit. supra note 48, at 183.

61. Representation of urban areas in Indiana's General Assembly, as in other states,
is not directly proportionate to its percentage of the total population. Consequently,
legislation affecting the peculiar interests of urban areas is at the mercy of rural repre-

sentatives who cannot fully appreciate the needs of urban areas. Moreover, the limited
biennial sessions of the General Assembly allow insufficient time for a scientific determination of the immediate needs of cities and towns to say nothing of providing for
emergencies that may arise in the interim.

62. The first Indiana General Assembly (1816) enacted a general law for the incorporation of towns. Acts 1817, c. 17. It became the practice however, for the General
Assembly to grant each city or town its charter by special act. Abuse of the privilege
to enact special laws relating to cities and towns, largely at the solicitation of municipali-

ties themselves, led to the constitutional prohibition of special legislation in 1851. IND.
CONST. Art. IV, §§ 22, 23.
63. Prior to 1905, there were but two general classes of municipal corporations in
Indiana-cities and towns. When it was desired to make particular laws applicable only

to certain cities or towns special classes were created. Thus, there were many classes of
cities and towns before the general law of 1905 classifying cities under the 1851 constitution. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-1201 (Bums 1950).
64. See II EsAREY,

HISTORY OF INDIANA

974-979 (1935) for a consideration of this

problem.
65. This plan is based upon the English system of control. See GooDNow, MUNIcIPAL GOVERNIENT 136-138

(1919).

66. For an analysis of the Indiana plan see Dortch, The "Indiana Plan" in Action,
27

NATIONAL

MuNIcrAL REv. 525 (1938).
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administrative supervision over local governmental functions in other
areas." A system of state administrative supervision and control" would
avoid many of the inadequacies of the present system of control, providing the desirable element of flexibility and at the same time protecting
the higher interest of the state in seeing that local governments conform
to the highest possible standards of efficiency.
The identity of local governments with the people must be preserved.
The growing interdependence of communities economically and the costliness of services and functions demanded by citizens of local governments
serve to illustrate also the broader responsibility of the state in protecting
the welfare of its citizens. It is submitted that an amendment granting
procedural powers will do much to relieve many of the problems arising
as a result of the present system of control over the form and internal
organization of cities and towns. The problems of state-local relations
can best be solved, however, by creating an administrative board invested
with the authority for a continuous determination of the proper functions
of local governments. The ultimate solution depends, in a large measure,
on an enlightened, voluntary cooperation between local authorities and
state administrative agencies.

A CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEMS IN
CONSORTIUM RECOVERY
From judicial decisions, scholarly texts, and journal writings a pressure is being generated leaving the law of consortium in unrest.' The
impetus for this pressure is easily discernable in a typical situation in67. Administrative control is most pronounced in the areas of finance, education,
highways, public health and social welfare. But no state has developed a systematic basis for administrative controls, encompassing all the major functions of government.

See

SCHULZ, AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT

148 (1949).

68. Two principal plans of administrative control have been used. One involves
concentrating within a single state agency control over the various municipal functions.
The plan followed in the United States is characterized by the distribution of control
among existing administrative agencies. Id. at 149.
1. A recent leading case allowing a wife to recover for negligent invasion of consortium rights is Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Two jurisdictions have followed this judicial innovation. Brown v. Georgia Tennessee Coaches Inc.,
88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953) ; Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb.
1953). For a discussion of the various aspects of consortium favoring the view of granting recovery to the wife see, HARPER, TORTS 566 (1933) ; PROSSER, TORTS 948 (1941) ;
Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium,22 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1923); Lippman, The Breakdozwn of Consortium, 30 COL. L. REv. 651 (1930) ; Notes, 9 IND. LJ. 182
(1933), 5 CORNELL L.Q. 171 (1920), 39 CORNELL L.Q. 761 (1954), 35 Ky. L.J. 220
(1947) ; 39 MIcH. L. REV. 820 (1940), 23 U. OF CiN. L. REV. 108 (1954).

